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Predication is a complex entity in Aristotelian thought. The aim of the present essay is to account for this 
complexity, making explicit the diverse forms it assumes. To this end, we turn to a crucial chapter of the 
Posterior Analytics (1 22), where, in the most complete and developed manner within the corpus, Aristotle 
proceeds to systematize this topic. From the analysis, it will become apparent that predication can assume, 
generically, five forms: 1) the predication of essence (to ; a ujtw '/ e i\na i ka thgor e i's q a i), that is of the genus 
and the specific differentia; 2) essential predication (to ; a ujtw '/ e i\na i ka thgor ei's q a i), that is either of the 
genus or of the differentiae (or their genera); 3) the predication of accidents per se; 4) the predication of 
simple accidents (wJ"  s umb e b hkovta  ka thgo re i's qa i); 5) accidental predication (ka ta; s umb eb hko;" 
ka thgo re i's q a i). However, only types 2-4 are forms of strict predication (aJpl w '"). In effect, the 
“predication” of essence is not a genuine predication, but a formula for identity, constituting, technically, the 
statement of the essence of the subject (or its definition). On the other hand, accidental “predication” can 
only be conceived of as such equivocally, since it results from a linguistic accident through which the 
ontological subject of the attribution suffers a displacement to the syntactic position of the predicate, which 
is not, by nature, its own. In neither case does the phrase bring about any legitimate predication. The study 
concludes with a discussion of Aristotle’s thesis according to which no substance can be a predicate, which 
is implied by its notion of accidental predication, a thesis which has been – and in our opinion wrongly so – 
challenged in modern times. 
 
 
 
Predication is a complex entity in Aristotle’s thought. The object of the present paper is to 
account for that complexity, rendering explicit the several forms it assumes. Given the significance 
of this concept in Aristotle’s logic and ontology, the task is relevant per se. It is, however, 
particularly important to avoid the confusion that can easily set in between two concept pairs whose 
members Aristotle is careful to discriminate: one, accidental predication (ka t a; s um b e bh ko;" 
ka t hgor e i's q a i) as different from predication of accidents (wJ"  s um b e b h kovt a  kat h go re i's q a i); 
the other, essential predication (t o ; e jn t w'/ t i v e js t i ka t h go r e i's qa i) as different from predication of 
the essence (t o ; a u jt w'/ e i\na i kat h go r e i's qa i). And this is so because, for Aristotle, neither 
accidental predication nor predication of the essence is, strictly speaking, predication, but rather the 
“lower” and “upper” margins within whose scope predication is defined. 
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 The “upper” limit – predication of the essence – is definition. The distinction between 
definition and approximate forms of predication (viz., essential predication) is crucial to set up a 
precise distinction between predication and definition and to understand the singularity the notion 
of definition holds within the set of attributive statements in Aristotle. The “lower” limit 
corresponds to that which Philoponus dubbed “counternatural predication” (pa r a ; f uvs i n), so as to 
distinguish it from predication proper or, as he would call it, “natural predication” (ka t a; f u vs i n)1 – 
clearly, a heavily symbolic classification.  
 It is in a crucial chapter of the Posterior Analytics (I 22), a chapter which apparent purpose is 
merely to show the impossibility of an infinite chain of premises in demonstration, that Aristotle 
will present, in a thorough and systematic manner, a schematisation of the various types of 
predication. Accordingly, it will be by addressing this chapter, in the form of a running commentary 
on each of its significant units, that we will attempt to follow Aristotle’s lesson on this issue.  
 
1. Strict Predication and Accidental Predication 
 
Text: 2 
In the case of predicates constituting the essential nature of a thing [tw'n ejn tw '/ tiv ejs ti ka thgo ro umevnw n], 
the situation is clear: if definition is possible, or, in other words, if essential form is knowable, 3 and an 
infinite series cannot be traversed, predicates constituting a thing's essential nature [ta; e jn tw'/ tiv ejs ti 
ka thgo ro uvme na] must be finite in number. But as regards predicates generally we have the following 
prefatory remarks to make. We can affirm without falsehood that the white (thing) is walking and that that big 
(thing) is a log; or again, that the log is big and that the man walks. But the affirmation differs in the two cases. 
When I affirm that the white is a log, I mean that something which happens to be white is a log [o{ti w|/ 
sumbevbhke leukw'/ ei\nai xuvlon ejstivn], not that white is the subject in which log inheres; for it is not because 
it is white or precisely a certain type of white [ou[d j o{per leukovn ti] that the white (thing) comes to be a log. 
Therefore, the white (thing) is not a log except incidentally [literally, by accident: w{st j oujk e[stin ajll j h] 
kata; sumbebhkov"]. On the other hand, when I affirm that the log is white, I do not mean that something else, 
which happens also to be a log [ejkeivnw'/ de; sumbevbhke xuvlw/ ei\nai], is white (as I should if I said that the 
musician is white, which would mean that the man who happens also to be a musician [w|/ sumbevbhken ei\nai 
mousikw'/] is white); on the contrary, log is here the subject, which actually came to be white and did so because 
it is a log or precisely a certain log, not because it is something else. If, then, we must lay down a rule, let us 
entitle the latter kind of statement predication [kathgorei'n], and the former not predication at all, or not strict 
[aJplw'"] but accidental predication [kata; sumbebhkov"]. 
                                                 
1
  Cf. In APo. 236.24-26 Wallies. 
2
 APo. I 22, 82b37-83a17. (All translations of this chapter are Mure’s, with corrections.) 
3
 Here, the conjunction h[ clearly holds epexegetic, not disjunctive, value (thus Mure, Tredennick, Tricot). 
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Comment: 
In these two paragraphs, Aristotle drafts a preliminary enumeration of several types of 
predication: essential predication;4 predication proper, or strict predication;5 and accidental 
predication.6 Strict predication (a Jpl w'")7 and accidental predication (ka t a; s um b e bh kov")8 are 
clearly distinguished at the end of the passage as opposite types of predication. The text is, at this 
point, particularly interesting. The distinction between accidental and strict predication is there 
made to depend on a metaphysical interpretation of the subject/predicate pair, namely, that not 
every object that can fill the predicate’s logical or syntactic slot in a sentence is a predicate in the 
ontological sense, and particularly the actual predicate of the sentence’s subject, that is, something 
that actually belongs to it. A more basic distinction is here being assumed between that which is a 
predicate by nature, i.e., that which is said of something (of a “natural” subject), and that which is a 
subject by nature, i.e., that of which something (a “natural” predicate) is said. 
Aristotle’s thesis that no individual (or, in the terms of the Categories, no primary substance) 
can be a predicate is here justified. What it states is that every individual is “naturally” a subject, for 
which reason it cannot be (from an ontological point a view) a predicate. When an individual comes 
to be a predicate (from a logical or syntactic point of view), which is to say, when it happens that 
the name of an individual, or, in general, a singular term, fills the predicative slot in an attributive 
sentence, this happens in a merely accidental way, i.e., by virtue of a linguistic accident that 
abusively shifts it to that inappropriate slot.9 Now, this is the assumption that justifies the distinction 
between strict predication (where subject and predicate are “natural”) and accidental predication, 
where subject (e.g., musician in “The musician is white”) or both subject and predicate (e.g., 
                                                 
4
  82b37-83a1. 
5
  83a9-14. 
6
  83a4-9. 
7
  83a16. 
8
  83a16-17. 
9
  See, typically, APr. I 27, 43a32-36: “It is clear then that certain things are not naturally said of anything 
[e[nia  tw'n o[ntw n ka t j oujd e no;"  pevf uke  l evge s q a i]: in fact, each sensible thing has such a nature that it 
cannot be predicated of anything, save by accident [pl h;n w J"  ka ta; s umb e b hkov"], as when we say that that 
white thing is Socrates [to; l e uko;n e jk e i'no  S w kr avthn e i\na i] or that that thing that approaches us is Callias 
[ka i; to ; pro s io;n Ka lliva n].” 
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“That white thing is a log”) are not “natural”.10 We can thus say that, concerning the distinction 
between these two types of predication, the late neo-Platonic nomenclature that dubbed them 
“natural” and “counternatural”, respectively, albeit not introduced by the Stagirite, quite aptly 
reflects the spirit of his doctrine in this regard.  
It is worth pointing out that the relation of either one or both types of predication to the 
essential predication mentioned in the first paragraph is nowhere clarified. Furthermore, it is not 
explicit whether such predication should be included under strict predication or, on the contrary, 
whether it should be understood as some autonomous type to which the two other types of 
predication distinguished in the second paragraph would jointly oppose. In this circumstance, the 
table resulting from the two initial paragraphs can be, quite simply, as follows:  
 
1st PREDICATION TABLE  
 Essential (ejn tw '/ tiv ejs ti) 
Predication Strict (aJpl w '") 
 Accidental (ka ta; s umb eb hkov") 
 
However, given that all examples added in the second paragraph are examples of non-essential 
predication, one could assume that the distinction Aristotle introduced therein between strict 
predication and accidental predication is not to be added to the type mentioned in the first 
paragraph, but to oppose to it, which would entail reformulating the table thus: 
 
2nd PREDICATION TABLE 
 Essential (ejn tw '/ tiv ejs ti) 
Predication 
   Strict (aJpl w '") 
Non-essential  Accidental (ka ta; s umb eb hkov") 
 
                                                 
10
 Along the same lines, cf. Metaph. D 7, 1017a7-22, and also: Int. 11, 21a7-16; APr. I 27, 43a32-43; APo. I 
4, 73b5-10; APo. I 19, 81b23-29. Other scattered occurrences in: APo. I 13, 79a6; Ph. I 4, 188a8; Metaph. A 
6, 987b23; B 4, 1001a6; 1001a10; 1001a 28; N 1, 1087a33; 1087a 35; 1088a28. 
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This is why the differentiation between strict and accidental predications opens the subsequent 
text, which is aimed at excluding the latter, but not the former, from the discussion.  
 
2. Strict Predication 
 
Text: 12 
White and log will thus serve as types respectively of predicate and subject. We shall assume, then, that the 
predicate is invariably predicated strictly [aJpl w '"] and not accidentally [ajlla ; mh; ka ta ; s umb e b hkov"] of the 
subject, for on such predication demonstrations depend for their force. It follows from this that when a single 
attribute is predicated of a single subject, the predicate must affirm of the subject either some element 
constituting its essential nature [h] e jn tw '/ tiv e js tin], or that it is in some way qualified, quantified, related, 
active, passive, placed, or dated. 
Comment: 
The content of the present paragraph can be captured in the following theses: 
1) In every predicative sentence, a predicate stands in the same relation to the subject as 'B' 
stands to 'A' in the standard sentence 'A is B'. 
2) The predicate can be predicated of the subject either strictly or accidentally. 
3) In canonical, or strict, predicative sentences, the predicate stands in the same relation to 
the subject as “white” stands to “log” in the sentence “The log is white”. (Up to this 
point, we have merely summed up the doctrine accounted for in the previous 
paragraph.) 
4) Now, every strict predication abides by the table of categories; therefore, in such 
predication, the predicate says of the subject either what the subject is, or of which type 
it is, or how many it is, or in relation to what it is, etc.13 
5) In the first of the mentioned cases, the predication is essential predication (e jn t w'/ t i v 
e js t i n). 
6) In all remaining cases, it will certainly be strict, but not essential, predication.  
                                                 
12
 APo. I 22, 83a17-23. 
13
  This theme, a highly central one in Aristotelian logic and ontology, could not even begin to be 
summarised within the scope of the current essay. We thus refer the reader to the corresponding chapter in 
our Introdução Geral, pp. 489-495.  
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The consequences of this clarification for our subject matter, particularly for solving the 
problem left suspended in section 1, are evident. Following this clarification, strict predication is the 
predication type that can be essential or non-essential, in which case the former is rehabilitated (and 
given the same status as the latter) as a type of strict predication. We may now use the data from the 
current paragraph to put forward a third predication table:   
 
3rd PREDICATION TABLE  
 
Predication 
    Essential (ejn tw '/ tiv ejs ti) 
Strict (aJpl w '") 
    Non-essential (po iovn, po sovn...) 
 Accidental (ka ta; s umb eb hkov") 
 
There is a staggering difference between the second and third tables:  
 
2nd PREDICATION TABLE  3rd PREDICATION TABLE 
 
Predication 
Essential  
Non-essential 
 
Strict 
Accidental 
  
Predication 
Strict 
 
Accidental 
Essential  
Non-essential 
 
  
 In the left-hand side table, essential predication is opposed to both strict predication and 
accidental predication, which are here presented as two types of non-essential predication. In the 
right-hand side table, essential predication is placed under strict predication, and it is the latter 
which, in both its variants (essential predication and non-essential predication), is now opposed to 
non-strict, or accidental, predication. Clearly, the point of contrast concerns which locus to attribute 
to essential predication. Before such a huge discrepancy between the two doctrines, to which should 
we ascribe greater value? Should essential predication be considered a sub-type of strict predication 
(third table) or, on the contrary, it is to stand as a predication type, side-by-side with non-essential 
(strict and accidental) predication (second table)? This can only be decided in light of the 
information provided in the subsequent paragraphs. 
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3. Strict Predication (a) of the Substance and (b) of Accidents 
 
Text: 14 
Predicates which signify substance signify precisely the subject, or a certain type of the subject. Predicates 
not signifying substance which are predicated of a subject which is neither precisely what the subject is, nor 
a certain type of what the subject is, are accidents [s umb e b hkovta]. For instance, when you predicate white 
of man, man is not precisely white or precisely a certain type of white [o uj ga vr  e js tin oJ a [nq r w po "  o u[te 
o{pe r  l e uko;n o u[te  o{pe r  le ukovn ti], but rather animal, since man is precisely an animal [o{pe r  ga ;r  zw'/ovn 
e js tin o J a[nq r w po "]. These predicates which do not signify substance must be predicates of some other 
subject, and nothing can be white which is not white because of something else. 
Comment: 
In this paragraph, Aristotle sets forth a double alternative to what we have so far been 
indistinctly calling “essential predication”. On the one hand, some essential predicates (or “things 
which signify substance”) are those that “signify precisely the subject”. Under this usage, essential 
predicates express the subject itself and therefore, as far as predication is concerned, the predicate is 
identical to the subject.15 On the other hand, essential predicates can also be those that signify “a 
certain type of what the subject is”. In this instance, essential predicates do not express the subject 
itself, but that under which the subject falls in the generative scale, namely, a genus, or a differentia 
of the subject.16  
Considering the alternative here proposed, we may now understand that essential predication in 
a certain sense is and in a certain sense is not strict predication, which allows us to understand the 
reason for the discrepancy between the second and third tables, as well as to solve it, bringing it to a 
more enlightening compatibility. 
In a certain sense it is, and in another sense it is not, strict predication, because it itself already 
has two meanings, namely, those two we have just introduced. Let us be quite clear, though, as to 
what this means. It is not that, in Aristotle, the present sentence on the one hand excludes, while on 
the other hand includes, essential predication from strict predication. In fact, from Aristotle’s point 
                                                 
14
 APo. I 22, 83a24-32. 
15
  In Aristotle, the terms “identical”, “identification”, “identity”, which we will henceforth systematically 
use, always possess intensional value, expressing the interchangeability of the subject and the predicate  and 
not just their simple co-extensionality. Technically speaking, in Aristotle, the latter constitutes predication 
proper, whilst the former is the definition (cf. Topics I 4-5, 8). 
16
 Cf. 83b1. 
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of view, the characterisation of essential predication here introduced is stated against non-essential 
predication and within the general framework of strict predication. This much is shown in the fact 
that Aristotle proceeds to this characterisation after having restricted the discussion to strict 
predication17, and by his introducing in the next lines, as a contrast, predication of accidents18 as a 
second type of strict predication. Accordingly, essential predication is here presented as a sub-type 
of that which is called, simply, “to predicate” (k a t hgor e i'n a Jpl w'"). And this is clearly coherent 
with the fact that predication a Jpl w'" abides by the table of categories, wherein the substance (under 
which essential predicates fall) is merely a category amongst others.  
For Aristotle, the question is therefore simple: either there is proper (a Jp l w'") predication, in 
which case it abides by the table of categories, where essential predicates are included; or there is 
no predication at all, unless in a certain accidental sense. When we limit ourselves to predication 
a Jpl w'", as Aristotle does in the beginning, essential predication comes to be but a kind of strict 
predication, or, simply put, one kind of predication. In this light, to technically distinguish 
predication e jn t w'/ t i v ejs t i n, predication a Jpl w'" and predication ka t a; sum b e b h kov", as we did in 
our first table, is to deliberately distance ourselves from the Aristotelian classification. This is 
because, for Aristotle, either there is or there is not predication. If there is, then predication can as 
well be essential (ejn t w'/  t i v e js t i n). If there is not, it can nevertheless occur accidentally (ka ta; 
s um b e bh kov"). In Aristotle’s view, the crucial divide stands thus between (strict) predication and 
accidental predication. In face of this divide, essential predication has virtually no specificity at all 
(except, of course, to the extent that it is one of the types in which predication is subdivided).  
All this appears to definitively establish the third predication table as the correct one from an 
Aristotelian perspective. However, this is not so. And it is not so precisely because of the passage 
we are currently commenting. Despite what Aristotle could have, or would have liked to have, 
expressly acknowledged, this passage sets the grounds for a new account of strict predication, one 
which opposes not just accidental predication, but also essential predication, or, at least, a certain 
type of essential predication. It is, therefore, essential predication itself which is, in this clause, 
implicitly reassessed. This reassessment enables us to understand why essential predication in a 
                                                 
17
  83a17-23. 
18
  83a25-35. 
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sense is, and in another sense is not, strict predication and, above all, it enables us to understand in 
what sense essential predication is, and in what sense it is not, strict predication.   
From a general point of view, essential predication is, as already seen, strict predication, for 
predication e jn t w'/ t i v e js t i n predicates under the category of substance. However, the adjective 
“strict” means here only that essential predication is simply (aJpl w'") a type of predication and not a 
kind of pseudo-predication – a predication “by accident”. That said, if we pay close attention to the 
nature of essential predication, as it is here defined by Aristotle, we realise that there is something 
fundamental that sets it apart from every other type of predication a Jpl w'". In this sense, the term 
a Jpl w'" acquires a new meaning, circumscribing everything that is predication proper, as opposed to 
accidental “predications” which, due to some motive, are not genuine predications, but also as 
opposed to essential “predications” which, due to another motive, are not, likewise, genuine 
predications.   
Accidental “predications” are not genuine predications because the sentence’s predicate does 
not express an actual predicate of the subject, i.e., something that truly belongs to it. In Aristotle’s 
terms, in sentences expressing such “predications”, the predicate is not attributed to the subject in 
virtue of the subject being precisely what it is, but because something else (sometimes, the predicate 
itself) is, accidentally, that subject. Thus, in “The musician is white”, it is not because the musician 
is a musician, but because there is a certain man who happens to be a musician, that the predicate is 
(accidentally) attributed to the subject. Likewise, in “that white thing is a log”, it is not because that 
white thing is white, but because there is a certain log which happens to be white, that the predicate 
is (accidentally) attributed to the subject. In this sense, the reason why accidental “predications” are 
not genuine predications is that one necessary condition of predication is not fulfilled: the predicate 
is not attributed to the subject because the subject is what it is (or, which is the same, the predicate 
is not attributed to the subject as something that really belongs to it). In accidental predications, 
what we see is that, by virtue of a syntactic accident, something that is not a “natural” predicate, or 
a “natural” subject, shifts, in the sentence, into a logical place that does not “naturally” belong to it. 
Now, in the case of essential “predications”, this requirement is fulfilled. But, in a way, it is 
excessively fulfilled, for, in this case, the predicate is not simply attributed to the subject because 
the subject is precisely what it is, but because the subject is precisely that predicate. Accordingly, 
whereas in accidental “predications” the predicative link does not truly exist, for the sentence’s 
10 
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predicates are not actual predicates of the subject, in essential “predications”, the predicative link is 
not truly predicative, for the sentence’s predicates are not predicates of the subject in the strict sense 
of the word (a Jpl w'") –  they are the subject itself. 
In a word, essential “predications” are not, for Aristotle, genuine predications, but identity 
formulae. They must thus be distinguished from strict predication, just as it happened with 
accidental “predications”, albeit for a different reason. Granted that nowhere in this chapter does 
Aristotle expressly draw this conclusion. However, in the overall context of his works, this 
conclusion is required by the characterisation of predication qua attribution “of something to 
something” (t i ; ka ta; t i no v"),19 or “of another to another” (e {t e r o n kaq  j eJt evr o u),20 or still “of one 
to one” (e }n ka q  j e Jno v"),21 whereas the attribution of essence is a process “of the same to the same” 
(a u jt a; a uJt w'n).22  
In sum, essential “predication” cannot be strictly considered as predication, in that it is a 
definition: and a definition does not say something of something, but simply the something;23 it 
does not say of something that [it] is something, but merely what the something is.24 It should be 
noted that the present lesson absolutely concords with the distinction, consistently assumed by 
Aristotle, in the context of the classification of the principles of demonstration,25 between saying 
“what it is” (o {t i e[s t i) and saying “what it means” (t i v s h m a ivne i): definitions do not say that 
something is something, they merely say what something means. Therefore, only axioms and theses 
(hypotheses and postulates) are predications – not so definitions. Definitions are not so because they 
do not contain a t i ; ka tav t i no"  l evg e sq a i, but the mere analysis of a concept. 
                                                 
19
 Cf. Int. 6, 17a25 (and 3, 16b6-10); APr. I 1 24a16. 
20
 Cf. Cat. 3, 1b10. 
21
 See, especially, APo. I 22, 83b17-19. 
22
  Cf. ibid. 
23
 See APo. II 4, 91b1-7 (and cf. 91a15-16; II 6, 92a6-9; II 13, 96a20-b1); Top. I 5, 102a13-14 (and cf. VII 2, 
152b39-153a1); Metaph. Z 4, 1030a7-11.  
24
 Paradigmatically in APo. II 3, 90b38-91a2: “Furthermore, to prove what it is [to ; tiv e js ti] and that it is 
[o{ti e [s ti] is different. Definition shows what it is, while demonstration [shows] that this is or is not [said] 
of that [hJ d e ; a jpovd e ixi"  o{ti e [s ti tovd e  ka ta; to u'de  h] o ujk e [s tin].” But cf. also APo. I 1, 71a11-17; 2, 
72a18-24; 10, 76b35-77a4. 
25
  Cf. APo. I 1, 71a1-17; 2, 72a14-24; 10, 76a31-36. 
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Now, this allows us to understand why is it that essential predication is and is not strict 
predication and the sense in which it is and the sense in which it is not strict predication. In fact, 
everything we have developed throughout the present point is valid for definitions only: and what 
the doctrine introduced in this passage shows exactly is that not every essential predication is a 
definition. Aristotle distinguishes between essential predicates that mean precisely that of which 
they are predicated and those that mean a certain type of that of which they are predicated. Let us 
recall an excerpt already cited:26 
For instance, when you predicate white of man: man is not precisely white or precisely a certain type of 
white, but rather animal, since man is precisely an animal.  
 That is: in the predication “the man is white”, subject and predicate are not the same, 
because the man is not the white, nor a certain type of white (a specific kind of white). But in the 
predication “man is an animal”, subject and predicate are the same, because man is a (certain type 
of) animal, i.e., a specific kind of animal. In the former predicative sentence, that which is attributed 
is, therefore, an accident of man (white), whereas the latter attributes that of which man is a species 
(animal). Now, in general, these two examples outline the distinction between predication of 
accidents and predication of the substance as types of strict predication. However, if we were to add 
to them the example Aristotle does not provide in this step, viz., “man is a biped animal”, where 
subject and predicate are the same (for man is precisely what to be a biped animal is) the existence 
of a further type of “predication” would clearly follow – one that would no longer be strict, but 
instead more-than-strict (so to speak), or hyperbolic, for here the predicate is precisely the subject. 
 The difference between the two types of essential predication is clear: in general 
predication under the category of substance, the subject is not identified with the predicate (man is 
not animal); instead, it is identified as “a certain type” of the predicate (man is a certain kind of 
animal). In predication of the essence, on the contrary, the subject is identified with the predicate 
itself (man is a biped animal); we have here, thus, a definition. In other words, the copulative 
relation is not, in the latter case, from predicate to subject, rather from definiens to definiendum. 
That is why the distinction between the two types of sentence is, from a logical point of view, 
quite clear too: only the latter is convertible, the former is not. This is precisely what the notion of 
                                                 
26
  83a28-30. 
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definition as a predication both proper and essential (i.e., where the terms preserve an identity that 
is at the same time extensional and intensional, comprehending both the objects referred by the 
concepts and the meaning of the concepts themselves) will technically legislate. 27 Now, only in the 
former case, where the predicate says the same as the subject, do we have a definition, where both 
genus and differentia are attributed to the subject. In the latter case, on the contrary, that which is 
attributed to the subject is an essential predicate (either the genus or the differentia), but not the 
whole definiens. Thus, in the former case, the sentence expresses an identity, and is not strictly a 
predication, whereas in the latter, despite the fact that the attributed predicates are e jn t w'/ t i v e js t i n, 
they are not the t iv e js t in itself, and thus the attribution is operated as a predication stricto sensu 
(ka t h go re i 'n aJpl w'"). 28 
 We are now able to establish the sense in which essential predication is and the sense in 
which it is not strict predication: it is strict predication when that which is attributed is an essential 
predicate of the subject, but not the complete essence of the subject; it is not strict predication when 
that which is attributed is the very essence of the subject or, in other words, when it is a definition. 
One must therefore distinguish between: (a) predication of essence, (b) essential strict predication 
(“of the substance”), (c) non-essential strict predication (“of accidents”) and (d) accidental 
predication. In face of these elements, it is now possible to revise the Aristotelian table of 
predication thus:  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
  Cf. APo. II 4, 91a15-16;  6, 92a6-9; 13, 96a20-b1; but especially: Top. I 4, 101b19-23; 6, 102b27-35; 8, 
103b6-19; VI 1, 139a31-32; VII 5, 154a37-b12; and passim. 
28
 On the distinction between essential predication and predication of the essence (or definition), the clearest 
passage is perhaps the following: “For if A is predicable as a mere consequent of B and B of C, A will not on 
that account be the definable form of C: A will merely be what it was true to say of C. Even if A is predicated 
of all B inasmuch as B is precisely a certain type of A [oujd  j e ij e [s ti to; A  o{pe r  ti ka i; ka ta; to u' B  
ka thgo re i'ta i pa nto v"], still it will not follow: being an animal is predicated of being a man (since it is true 
that in all instances to be human is to be animal, just as it is also true that every man is an animal), but not as 
identical with being man [a jll j o ujc  o u{tw "  w{s te  e}n e i\na i].” (APo. II 4, 91b1-7; and cf. also II 13, 96a20-
b1) 
13 
 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Vol. VI 2012 Issue 2 
 
 
 
 
4th PREDICATION TABLE  
 Of the essence (to; ti v h\n  ei \n a i)  definition: genus and differentiae 
Predication Strict (a Jpl w'") of the substance (ejn  t w'/ ti v  ejs ti)  
of accidents (s u m bebhkov ta)  
      essential predicate: genus or differentiae 
accidental predicate: quality, quantity … 
 Accidental (ka ta ; s u m be bh kov ")   
 
The following observations may be taken as the key of the table, so to speak: 
1) Predication of the essence is the statement of the essence of the subject, i.e., the definition. 29 
2) Strict predication is that in which a “natural” predicate is said of a “natural” subject. 
3) When the predicate is part of the subject’s essence (in other words, when it is a predicate 
under the category of substance), the case is one of strict predication of the substance. 
4) When the predicate is a simple accidental predicate of subject (alternatively, when it is a 
predicate under a category other than that of substance), the case is one of predication of the 
accident. 
5) Accidental predication is that in which predication proceeds in a “counternatural” way 
either because [a], in a sentence, an accident is attributed to another accident (“The 
musician is white”), or because [b], in a sentence, a substance is attributed to an accident 
(“that white thing is a log”). 
As we shall see, the next text will provide us with elements to fine-tune this terminology and to 
adapt it in accordance with the Aristotelian table of predication. 
 
4. A preliminary account 
  
Before moving forwards, though, let us see how these data and those that follow from the 
previous paragraph enable us to adjust and improve the classification of predication types implicitly 
                                                 
29
 Top. I 5, 101b38. Cf. APo. II 3, 90b29-33; Top. I 4, 101b17-23; 8, 103b6-12; V 2, 130b25-28; 3, 131b37-
132a9; VII 3, 153a6-22; 5, 154a23-32; 155a18-22; Metaph. D 8, 1017b21-22; Z 4, 1030a2-b13; 5, 1031a1-
14; 13, 1039a19-20; and also APo. I 22, 82b37-83a1; II 3, 90b3-4; Top. I 6, 102b27-35; I 18, 108a38-b6; V 
5, 135a9-12; VI 4, 141a26-b2; 141b15-34; Metaph. B 3, 998b4-8. 
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addressed in this chapter of the Posterior Analytics. After those paragraphs where he distinguished 
accidental predication from strict predication, restricted the investigation to the latter and brought 
back that which can be predicated under the scope of the table of categories, Aristotle advances two 
steps in this paragraph: on the one hand, he integrates predicates under the category of substance in 
predication a Jpl w'"; on the other, he reintroduces the notion of accident, with a new purpose, viz., 
not as means to discriminate between types of predication, but to designate one of the predicate 
classes that, together with those that fall under the category of substance, will exhaust the entirety of 
what can be strictly predicated. 30 
 Taken together, the two newly integrated elements do not add new types of predication to the 
already established ones. What they do bring is a further characterisation of the types in which strict 
predication is subdivided: the predication of substance, on the one hand, and the predication of 
accidents, on the other. However, the simple fact that Aristotle makes here explicit that predication 
of accidents is a kind of strict predication is, in itself, significant in another regard. By doing so, the 
difference between the two senses in which the word s um b e bh kov" may intervene to qualify 
predication is conclusively rendered clear: in one of those senses, it determines accidental 
predication, which is accidental insofar as it is not predication except by accident (ka t a; 
s um b e bh kov", per accidens); in the other, quite distinct, sense, it delimits predication of accidents, 
which is predication stricto sensu (a Jpl w'"), although that which is given through it as predicates of 
the subject are its accidents (wJ"  s um b e bh kovt a, qua accidens). In the first case, accidentalness 
qualifies the very predication: and, via this qualificative, such “predication” stands excluded from 
the set of strict predication. In the second case, accidentalness qualifies but the predicate: therefore, 
the genuine character of the predication is not affected. In the first case, accidentalness has a 
methodological sense and its task is to keep seemingly predicative formulae from the strict domain 
of predication. In the second case, it bears ontological value and its task is to discriminate a certain 
type of predicate that has legitimate place in strict predication. Retrospectively, it is not immaterial 
that, when distinguishing between accidental predication and strict predication, Aristotle never fails 
                                                 
30
 For which reason, as aptly noted by Ross, “the predication of s umb e bhkovta is of course to be 
distinguished from the predication ka ta; s umbe b hkov" dealt with in the previous paragraph” (Aristotle’s 
Prior and Posterior Analytics, p. 577). 
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to mention predication of accidents as an instance of strict predication:31 for that means that, in the 
distinction between (strict) predication and mere accidental predication, a further distinction, viz., 
between predication of accidents and accidental predication, is also being established.32 
This is, of course, a particularly important point of the present text. At the same time, though, 
and as we have just seen in considerable detail, the paragraph also suggests another relevant aspect: 
by virtue of its very structure, predication of the substance would be better characterised if we allow 
it to be distinguished further, between predication of the essence (which is not, strictly speaking, 
predication, and should therefore be treated separately, viz., as definition) and predication of that 
which “is in the essence”, namely, the genus or the differentia (which is, from a logical standpoint, 
strict predication – albeit with unique features – and can thus be considered as a subtype of 
predication a Jpl w'", viz., essential predication). 
 One final observation. Obviously enough, the notion of substance sanctions two different 
meanings in this context: one, the category under which the substance is predicated (i.e., predication 
of genera or of differentiae); the other, the “natural” subject which, in one of the accidental 
predication modalities, is shifted to the predicate’s logical slot. In neither of these senses, however, 
is the substance itself a predicate: in the former case, it stands as a category of predicates (the 
genera and differentiae said of subjects); in the latter, it is a substance stricto sensu, therefore 
necessarily a subject that only by accident comes to fill the predicate’s logical slot. One should note 
at this point that Aristotle does not clarify [a] whether “substance” should be here interpreted as 
concerning primary substances (in the sense of the Categories) only, both primary and secondary 
substances, or, in general, any subject exhibiting the logical behaviour of a substance,33 and [b] 
whether one should take “predicates under the category of substance” to mean those genera and 
differences said of primary substances only, or these plus those said of secondary substances, or, in 
                                                 
31
 “We can affirm without falsehood that the white (thing) is walking and that that big (thing) is a log; or 
again, that the log is big and that the man walks. But the affirmation differs in the two cases. When I affirm 
that the white is a log, I mean that something which happens to be white is a log, not that white is the subject 
in which log inheres …” (APo. I 22, 83a1-7) 
32
 The most paradigmatic case is to be found in APo. I 19, 81b25-29: “Here is what I mean by ‘accidental’: 
when we say, for instance, that that white thing is a man we are not saying the same thing as when we say 
that the man is white, since the man is not white because he is something else, while the white thing [is a 
man] because the white is, for man, an accident.”  
33
 Cf. Metaph. Z  1, 1028a36-b2; 4, 1030a17-27. 
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general, genera and differences of any subject exhibiting the logical behaviour of a substance.34 
This question could have three different answers, depending on the dominion it concerns. In the 
context of the discussion motivating these developments (viz., the possibility of demonstrations 
having an infinite number of premises), the appropriate response would be the most restrictive, for 
the purpose would be that of guaranteeing that the series of subjects stops at individuals (and the 
series of predicates at categories). In the wider context of Posterior Analytics, the convenient 
answer would be either of intermediate restrictiveness or the broadest possible, in that 
demonstrations typically deal with universals, for which reason both predicates and subjects should 
be universal. Generally speaking, nothing militates against choosing the broadest answer; on the 
contrary, everything points towards it being the favoured one. 
  
5. Predication of Accidents (a) Per Se and (b) Not Per Se 
 
Text: 35 
I assume first that predication implies a single subject and a single attribute [uJpovk e ita i d h; e }n ka q j e Jno;"  
ka thgo re i's q a i] and secondly that, in the case of non-essential predication, the same things are not 
predicated of the same things [a ujta ; d e; a uJtw 'n, o {s a  mh; tiv e js ti, mh; ka thg o re i's q a i]. We assume this 
because such predicates are all accidents, though some are accidents per se [ajlla ; ta; me ;n ka q j a uJta v] and 
others of a different type [ta ; d e; ka q’  e{te ro n tr ovpo n]. Yet we maintain that all of them alike are predicated 
of some subject and that an accident is never a subject, since we do not class anything as accident except 
when what it says is said due to its being something other than itself [o ujd e;n ga ;r  tw'n to io uvtw n tivq e men  
e i\na i o} o ujc  e{te ro vn ti o]n l e vge ta i o } l evge ta i] … 
Comment: 
We introduce now the last remaining element that allows us to complete the Aristotelian 
classification of predication: the distinction between accidents per se and “simple” accidents.36 We 
may reformulate the corresponding table thus: 
                                                 
34
 Cf. Top. I 9, 103b27-39; Metaph. Z 1, 1028a36-b2; 4, 1030a17-27. 
35
 APo. I 22, 83b17-23. 
36
 Cf. in this regard Metaph. D 30, 1025a30-34. Other occurrences, both explicit and implicit, of 
s umb eb hkovta  ka q’  a uJta v, can be found in: APo. I 7, 75b1 (and cf. I 10, 76b13; 28, 87a39); Ph. II 2, 193b27-
28, and III 4, 203b33 (and cf. De an. I 1, 402a7; 402a15; 402b18; 402b21; 402b23-24; 402b26-403a1; 5, 
409b14); PA I 3, 643a27-28 (and cf. I 1, 639a18-19; 639a26; 641a24-25); PA I 5, 645b1-3 (and cf. HA I 6, 
491a9-11; MA 1, 698a1-4); Metaph. B 1, 995b20; 995b25-26; 2, 997a20; 997a21-22 (and cf. Metaph. 
997a25-34; G  1, 1003a21-22; 2, 1005a13-14; E 1, 1025a10-13; 1026a31-32; K 3, 1061b4-6); M  3, 1078a5-6. 
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5th PREDICATION TABLE 
 
  Of the essence (to; tiv h\n e i\na i)   
Predication   Strict (aJpl w'") 
of the substance (ejn tw'/ tiv e js ti) 
 of accidents (s umb eb hkovt a)  
per se (kaq  j a uJta v) 
proper (kaq  j e {te ro n trovpo n) 
   Accidental (ka ta; s umbe bhkov")   
 
Some final observations in this regard: 
1) Predication stricto sensu is that which is neither accidental predication nor predication of 
the essence. 
2) It corresponds to three types: [i] predication of genus or differences; [ii] predication of 
accidents per se; [iii] predication of “simple” accidents. 
3) “Predication” of the essence is not, in fact, predication, rather an identity formula, in the 
terms previously mentioned. 
4) Accidental “predication” is predication only equivocally: in fact, it occurs only when, by 
virtue of a grammatical accident, the ontological subject of the attribution slides into the 
predicate’s syntactic slot, which is not naturally its own, so that, in the sentence, there is no 
actual restitution of any genuine predication. 
 
6. In defence of Aristotle: No Individual Can Be a Predicate  
 
This Aristotelian thesis, which although metaphysical in nature is, as seen throughout the 
current essay, indissociable from Aristotle’s doctrine on predication, was modernly challenged by 
several authorities. Amongst the classic moments, it is worth highlighting those produced during the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
We refer the reader to “O Problema da Definição do Acidente em Aristóteles” (Aspectos Disputados da 
Filosofia Aristotélica, pp. 143-202), where we have developed this issue at length. 
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earlier decades of the 20th century by Frank Plumpton Ramsey,37 John Cook Wilson,38 Jan 
Lukasiewicz39 and Peter Strawson.40 On this particular issue, the work of Cook Wilson is somewhat 
collateral, since it attempts to present a general doctrine on the nature of the subject and only 
marginally crosses paths with Aristotle’s. 41 Strawson’s essays, in turn, are, to a considerable extent, 
a recovery of the analysis developed by Ramsey, with whom he would come to part ways later,42 
for which reason it is preferable to resort to the original directly.43 We are thus left with Ramsey 
and Lukasiewicz, to whom we now turn our attention. 
The object of Ramsey’s essay is to show that “the whole theory of particulars and universals is 
due to mistaking for a fundamental characteristic of reality what is merely a characteristic of 
language”.44 To that effect, he attempts to show that “there is no essential distinction between the 
subject of a proposition and its predicate”, hence “no fundamental classification of objects can be 
based upon such a distinction”.45 Ramsey’s argument can be schematically presented thus: 
1. “Socrates is wise” and “Wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates” express the same 
proposition. 46  
2. However, that which is subject in one is predicate in the other, and vice-versa.  
                                                 
37
  “Universals”, Mind, 34, 1925 (reedited, with an appendix from 1926, in: The Foundations of Mathematics 
and other Logical Essays, pp. 112-134, 135-137, from which our quotations are taken). 
38
  Statement and Inference, I-II, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1926. 
39
  Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
19572 (we translate from the French edition: Paris, Librairie Armand Collin, 1972). 
40
  Successively in: “On Particular and General”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 54, 1953/1954, pp. 
233-261; “Logical Subjects and Physical Objects”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 17, 1957, 
pp. 441-457; “Logical Subjects and Physical Objects. A reply to Mr. Sellars”, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 17, 1957, pp. 473-477. 
41
  In the terms of that doctrine, a subject is that of which a sentence asserts something, which, depending on 
the context, may or may not coincide with the grammatical subject and, in general, with the nominal 
component that integrates the sentence.    
42
  Cf. Individuals, pp. 177-179 e 237. 
43
  For pertinent criticism on Strawson’s primitive position, see Sellars, “Logical Subjects and Physical 
Objects”, and Baylis, “Logical Subjects and Physical Objects. Comments”. 
44
  “Universals”, Foundations of Mathematics, p. 117. 
45
  Op. cit., p. 116. 
46
  In Strawson, who renovates, although more timidly, Ramsey’s argument, the typical example is “All 
Socrates' virtues were possessed by Plato” (cf. “Logical Subjects and Physical Objects”, pp. 446-449). 
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3. Now, given that any predicative sentence can be analogously converted into an equivalent 
sentence where subject and predicate switch places, it follows that “there is no essential 
distinction between the subject of a proposition and its predicate”. QED 
The argument would be persuasive if the second premise were true. As it happens, it is not. In 
fact, the first sentence’s predicate is the second sentence’s subject, but the first sentence’s subject is 
not the predicate of the second. “Socrates” is the subject of the first sentence; but the predicate of 
the second sentence is not Socrates, it is “a characteristic of Socrates”.47 Thus, Ramsey only showed 
something we already knew, at least since Aristotle: that everything that can be a predicate in a 
sentence can be a subject in another. He did not show, however, what he intended to show: that if it 
can be a subject in a sentence, then it can be a predicate in another. The Aristotelian irreducibility of 
the individual as ultimate subject remains thus unscathed. 
But there is more. The second premise involves a fatal ambiguity. When we say “that which is 
subject in one, is predicate in the other, and vice-versa”, the phrases “in one” and “in the other” 
indicate different things depending on whether they refer, in Ramsey’s terms, the sentence or the 
proposition.48 The point is that, if one adopts, as does Ramsey, the distinction between sentence and 
proposition, one assumes that the latter is relatively independent from the former, particularly in 
view of the fact that it is precisely in order to safeguard the inalterability of the proposition against 
formal variations that affect the sentence that the distinction itself is put forward. As such, 
switching the position of the terms within the sentence will not necessarily entail an equivalent 
permutation in the proposition it expresses, if it is the case, as it is here, that the fact asserted by the 
proposition remains essentially unchanged when the switch takes place in the sentence. Given that 
                                                 
47
  Sellars, too, points out, not only against Strawson, but directly against Ramsey, that in “Wisdom is 
instantiated by Socrates”, the predicate is not “Socrates”, rather “to be instantiated by Socrates” (cf. “Logical 
Subjects and Physical Objects”, p. 470).  
48
  The distinction between “proposition”, the assertive content of a sentence, and “sentence”, the 
proposition’s material support , can be considered an indissociable topic from essentialism in all its forms, 
already present in Aristotle, as we had occasion to show in “Ciência e Opinião em Aristóteles” (Aspectos 
Disputados da Filosofia Aristotélica, pp. 259-278), and, as we can see, also assumed by Ramsey. Quine 
made it an irreparably controversial issue; see, especially, “Ontological Remarks on the Propositional 
Calculus” (1934); “Speaking of Objects” (1958), pp. 21-25; Word and Object (1960), §§ 40-43; 
“Propositional Objects” (1968), pp. 139-144; Philosophy of Logic (1970), pp. 1-14; The Roots of Reference 
(1974), § 9, p. 36; Pursuit of Truth (19922), pp. 52-53, 77-79, 102; From Stimulus to Science (1995), pp. 77-
78. 
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the sentences “Socrates is wise” and “Wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates” express, according to 
Ramsey, the same proposition, the relation either sentence represents (the fact either sentence 
asserts, as Ramsey would put it) is the same: the relation of a predicate (wisdom) to a subject 
(Socrates) – a relation that holds regardless of how the proposition is grammatically transcribed, 
i.e., whichever term (“Socrates” or “wisdom”) happens to be the grammatical subject of the 
sentence. Now, there are two important things here. First, when we move from the sentence to the 
proposition, we realise that the subject is always the same – Socrates. That is, at the propositional 
level (which is to say, at the level of the relation represented by the sentence), the subject is, 
necessarily, the ultimate subject, i.e., the individual. Second, this is precisely why the propositional 
subject of a sentence “A is B” resists, by nature, being converted into a grammatical predicate; it 
can but integrate, as in the case of Ramsey’s example, the grammatical predicate of the converse 
sentence, which asserts that B is a characteristic of A (or that B pertains to A, or that B is said of A, 
etc.), i.e., which precisely asserts B as the predicate of A. 
We can now turn to Lukasiewicz. Commenting on a passage from Prior Analytics, he says: 49 
This passage50 contains some inaccuracies that it would be best to correct before going any further. It is 
wrong to say that one thing can be predicated by another; a predicate is part of a proposition,51 and a 
proposition consists in a series of uttered or written terms, which possess a certain meaning; therefore, one 
cannot predicate things: one can predicate the word “Callias” by another word: one cannot predicate Callias 
himself. The above classification does not concern things – it concerns terms.  
The reader who has followed our study thus far, or already possesses some knowledge, even if 
elementary, of Aristotelian thought, will realise that this whole excerpt is built upon a 
misunderstanding concerning two levels that Aristotle keeps quite apart: the ontological level, 
where we speak of predicates as something that pertains to things; and the logical level, where we 
speak of predicates as something that is said of things (through the terms by which things are 
referred). In the latter case, the predicate is in fact a term and it is in fact part of a sentence; in the 
former, however, the predicate is an entity and, as such, it is utterly extra-logical and extra-
linguistic. The entire Aristotelian system of categories (the ways according to which something is 
said to be) can only make sense assuming this presupposition. 
                                                 
49
  La syllogistique d’Aristote, p. 26. 
50
 APr. I 27, 43a25-43. 
51
  “Proposition”, in this context, has, of course, the same meaning as “sentence”. 
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More than that: the two levels are connected – and they are connected by the primacy of the 
former over the latter. In fact, it is only because something pertains to something else qua an 
ontological predicate that it can be said of that thing as a logical predicate. It is only insofar as 
something is a predicate of something that it can become that which is predicated of that thing in a 
sentence (in the latter case, subject and predicate are not, of course, the entities themselves, rather 
the terms that refer to those entities).52 In this sense, Aristotle never states or implies that “one thing 
can be predicated by another”: what he does say is that “something” (i.e., an entity, in general 
terms) can be a predicate of another. He certainly states and implies, however, that “things can be 
predicated”: for, although the subject of a predicative sentence is not the thing itself, it is the thing 
itself that, through its name, is predicated by the predicate of the predicative sentence.53 On our 
subject, Lukasiewicz adds: 54 
Likewise, it is wrong to say that individual or singular terms, e.g., “Callias”, cannot be truly predicated of 
anything. Aristotle himself is the first to line up examples of true propositions with singular predicates: “This 
white object is Socrates”; or “That who approaches is Callias”. These propositions are true, he says, “by 
accident”, 55 but there are other examples of the same kind which truth is not purely accidental, such as 
“Socrates is Socrates” or “Sophroniscus was Socrates’ father”. 
The negligence that this excerpt exhibits as to the Aristotelian doctrine that we have been 
analysing is disturbing. In fact, not only does the excerpt fully depend on the misconception just 
detected, for the notion of predication lies, as we saw, upon an ontological distinction that 
                                                 
52
  On the problem of accidental predication, Lear sees, correctly, the juxtaposition of two levels – logical and 
ontological – in all predication. Cf. Aristotle and Logical Theory, p. 31: “A phrase like ‘the white thing is a 
log’ is a degenerate form of predication, for it fails to reveal the metaphysical structure of subject and 
predicate. It is not that the white thing is the underlying subject which happens to be a log. Rather the log is 
the underlying subject which happens to be white (An. Post. 83a1-14). Only predications which reveal 
metaphysical structure are strict and it is with these that proof is concerned.” And a few lines ahead: 
“Aristotle distinguishes predicating from saying truly (An. Post. 83a38). Predication is not merely a linguistic 
act. Though one can say both ‘the white thing is a log’ and ‘the log is white’, only the latter is a genuine 
predication.” 
53
  In fact, even from the point of view of modern elementary logic, what does it mean to say that an object 
satisfies a predicate, other than that object has the property signified by the predicate and, consequently, that 
the predicate is predicated of it? Here is a point concerning which there has been a rather unjustified desire to 
draw distinctions between the assumptions of modern logic and those of Aristotelian logic.  
54
  Op. and loc. cit. 
55
  Lukasiewicz has here in mind those cases of accidental predication (ka ta; s umb e bhkov") to which we have 
made abundant reference in the text. 
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Lukasiewicz misses entirely, it also is wholly underpinned by four examples, none of which is an 
instance of predication, due to the exact reasons that our preceding analysis has made clear. This is 
evident in the case of the first two examples, taken from the Prior Analytics chapter under debate, 
for they correspond precisely to the examples given for accidental predication. In “that white object 
is Socrates”, as well as in “that who approaches is Callias”, “Socrates” and “Callias” are not 
predicates of “that white object” and “that who approaches”, respectively; rather, they are their 
corresponding names. The sentence is, consequently, an identity formula – not a predication.56 
 As to the third example, “Socrates is Socrates”, we do not see here how the second “Socrates” 
could be a predicate of the first. Why is the second Socrates said of the first and not the other way 
around? Could the author be suggesting that it is the order of the sentence that determines the 
predicate of the attribution? But then, if one says “Socrates was a great philosopher”, “Socrates” is 
the subject, yet if one says “A great philosopher was Socrates”, “Socrates” becomes the predicate? 
It is not, evidently, the order of the sentence that determines the predicate of the attribution. And it 
is also clear that the first and the second “Socrates” in the sentence “Socrates is Socrates” are 
undistinguishable as subject and predicate, which means, in other words, that the sentence does not 
express a predication. 
The fourth example is the most surprising. How does Lukasiewicz interpret the clause 
“Socrates’ father” in the sentence “Sophroniscus was Socrates’ father”? As a singular term? But, if 
it is a singular term, then it is either a name or a definite description: and, in both cases, not a 
predicate. Conversely, if it is a predicate (the predicate “x is Socrates’ father”), then it is not a 
singular term: it is the expression of a property that can be satisfied by objects designated by certain 
singular terms. In the first case, we have no “individual or singular term”, in Lukasiewicz words, as 
predicate; in the second, the predicate is not an “individual or singular term”. In both cases, the 
example does not demonstrate what Lukasiewicz intended it to demonstrate. The crucial point here 
is that Lukasiewicz’s whole reasoning misses – fundamentally – the Aristotelian doctrine in 
question. What Aristotle implies in the notion of accidental predication is the ontological thesis 
                                                 
56
  Cf., along the same line, R. Smith, “Logic”, p. 33: “But when we force ‘Socrates’ into predicate position, 
what we have no longer seems to be predication, but instead a kind of identification: ‘That man is Socrates’ 
amounts to ‘That man and Socrates are the same’.” 
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according to which an individual cannot be predicated of another. It is not a question of terms or 
linguistic predicates: it is a question of real things and actual predicates. 
Now, thus understood, the doctrine is clear as to all the examples given: the individual Socrates 
is not a predicate of that white blotch that I see over there; rather, white is a predicate of the 
individual Socrates. And it is only by virtue of a linguistic accident that we can incorrectly express 
this truth, saying “that white thing is Socrates”. From a logical point of view, the ontological notion 
of accidental predication means, thus, the following: the subject of the sentence shifts, by linguistic 
accident, into the predicate’s slot. And this entails, in the terms above mentioned, a more 
fundamental idea: the sentence “that white thing is Socrates” expresses the proposition “Socrates is 
white”. (Naturally, the same is valid in the sentence “that who approaches is Callias” and other 
similar sentences.) 
In the remaining examples, which are not instances of accidental predication, the ontological 
thesis according to which no individual can be a predicate is also not undermined.  In fact, all these 
(and the same would hold for the previous examples, which can be likewise interpreted) are cases of 
identity, not predication, and thus none exhibits individuals qua predicates. Alternatively, one 
would have to admit that, in sentences like “Sophroniscus was Socrates’ father”, the predicate 
(“Socrates’ father”) is not a singular term, but a general term (“x is the father of Socrates”), in 
which case the Aristotelian thesis is, once again, not affected. 
 
7. Final Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 The Aristotelian notion of accidental predication appeals, first of all, to a question of purely 
ontological character – one which is crucial to acknowledge as such, in order to avoid mistaking it 
with the related logical question. The ontological issue is thus: there are certain realities that, due to 
their very nature, cannot be predicates of anything. Lukasiewicz saw fit to correct Aristotle, 
recalling that only terms – not realities – can be predicates. But this only manifests the confusion as 
to the two levels. In Aristotle’s thought, a predicate is one thing and that which is predicated (viz., 
in the predicative sentence) is a whole other thing. Predicate is an ontological notion, and it has to 
do with that which belongs to a given thing (thus called, in equally ontological manner, its subject). 
That which is predicated is a logical notion, strictly dependent from the ontological notion, and it 
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has to do with what can be said of the subject (in a predicative sentence). In a predicative sentence, 
that which is predicated is, of course, a term. But this term can always be predicated of another, 
because what it designates is a predicate of that which is designated by the other.  
Now, there are things that cannot be (ontological) predicates of anything – such is the case of 
individuals. Accordingly, if the name of one of those things (i.e., a singular term) comes to be a 
parte of a predicative sentence, filling the predicate’s slot, there we have, literally, an accident. But 
do such cases really exist? Surely not in Aristotle’s examples (“The musician is white”, “that white 
thing is a log”): in his examples, what fills the predicate’s slot is never a singular term. But, for the 
sake of the argument, one could re-read the examples in Lukasiewicz’s vein (“this white object is 
Socrates”, “that who approaches is Callias”), where the predicate is, surely enough, a singular term. 
Before this situation, we are forced to reiterate: only accidentally can a name (a singular term) 
appear as a predicate in a predicative sentence, since the individual to which that name corresponds 
is not the actual predicate of the thing referred by the term appearing as subject in the sentence, as 
it is patently shown in Aristotle’s examples, and in Lukasiewicz’s, for that matter, and well 
explainable in light of the Aristotelian doctrine. Now, that accident by which the name of something 
that cannot be a (ontological) predicate appears as (logical) predicate is, quite clearly, an accident of 
linguistic nature. This is what Aristotle is saying when he states that the sentence “this white thing 
is a log” is an inversion of the true predication “the log is white”. And this is also the notion present 
in the neo-Platonic distinction between “natural” predication and “counternatural” predication. It is 
in this case, and in this case only, that the second level – the logical plan – intervenes.  
 One could argue that, from a logical standpoint, the distinction between natural and 
counternatural predication (an ontological distinction) is meaningless and, thus, that it is 
meaningless to say that the “real” subject of the proposition expressed by the sentence “this white 
thing is a log” is that which is represented, in the sentence, by the predicate. From a strictly logical 
point of view, “log” is said of “this white thing” and is, therefore, the sentence’s predicate. As to 
those ontological claims according to which, in the order of reality, it is white which is the predicate 
of log, and not the other way around, logic may very well respect them, but it is under no obligation 
to take them into consideration. However, if this were the case, in order to accommodate in extremis 
Aristotle’s thesis, it would be necessary to concede that, although the objects it designates could 
never be (ontological) predicates, singular terms themselves could, indeed, be (logical) predicates. 
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As it happens, this is not so. First of all, an Aristotelian could always argue that logic does not deal 
with sentences; it deals with propositions, where a singular term is never a predicate (except, of 
course, in identity formulae). Proposition, the last stronghold of essentialism, is also the last 
stronghold of metaphysics; and in the intensional dwelling of propositions, the ontological order of 
reality can always be preserved. Secondly, Aristotle would still have good reasons to maintain that, 
even from a logical standpoint, singular terms cannot be predicates.  
 Why? Because in every situation where accidental predication occurs, either the predicate is not 
an actual singular term, or the case is not one of predication. In “this white thing is a log” (a typical 
example in Aristotle), “a log” most certainly is not a singular term – it is a general one. What the 
sentence means to express is that it happens to this white thing (singular) to belong to the class 
(universal) of logs. To be perfectly fair to Aristotle, one should have put it vice-versa, but, for our 
purposes, the warning will suffice. No doubt this sentence, and every sentence equivalent to it, can 
always be read placing a singular term in the predicate’s position. In such case, it would read 
something like “this white thing is this log” – graceless equivalent of “this white thing is Socrates” 
or “that there is Callias”. But then, “this log”, or “Socrates”, or “Callias”, is not attributed to “this 
white thing” as predicate, rather as another name for “this white thing”, in which case the sentence 
is not asserting predication, but indeed identity, between the two terms. In this case, Aristotle’s 
accidental predication would be assimilated into the second class of Lukasiewicz’s examples. In 
other words, Aristotle’s accidental predication would be systematically reinterpreted as an ill-
formed (or “accidental”) identity formula. It is, to be sure, a somewhat far-fetched hypothesis. Yet, 
it holds a certain appeal, for it would allow us to reunite anew the two fringes, “lower” and “upper”, 
of Aristotle’s predication. 
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